Strategyproof Cost Sharing of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

Suresh Mutuswami

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 5, pages 793-808

Abstract: In a model of cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods, we examine the properties of mechanisms satisfying strategyproofness, no subsidy, outcome non-bossiness, budget balance, individual rationality and consumer sovereignty. We show that such mechanisms in general will not satisfy the equity property of equal treatment of equals. This contrasts with the single excludable public good case. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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