Backward Intergenerational Goods and Endogenous Fertility

John William Hatfield

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 10, issue 5, pages 765-784

Abstract: This paper characterizes the consequences of introducing the public provision of intergenerational goods to the elderly in a model with endogenous fertility. With exogenous fertility, it has been shown that the government can mandate the first-best outcome by simply imposing the socially optimal transfer. By contrast, with endogenous fertility, the government can no longer enforce this outcome. This is due, in part, to the effects of mandatory provision on the birth rate. However, taxes may still have a salubrious effect on social welfare as they can eliminate particularly bad equilibria. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

Date: 2008

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00385.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:5:p:765-784

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is edited by John P. Conley and Myrna Holtz Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().