Hooliganism and Police Tactics

Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 11, issue 3, pages 441-453

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a model of hooliganism to study how different types of policing can be expected to affect violence and the number of hooligans in violent supporter clubs. Hooligans differ in their preferred level of fighting, and obtain utility also from social identity that belonging to a supporter club gives. We find that an increase in discriminative policing, like intelligence units, always reduces violence. Indiscriminate policing, such as the use of teargas or random jailing of potential law breakers, may, however, backfire and result in smaller and more brutal groups. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01417.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:3:p:441-453

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is edited by John P. Conley and Myrna Holtz Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().