Leading by Example and International Collective Action

Andre Rossi Oliveira, Joao Ricardo Faria () and Daniel G. Arce

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 7, issue 1, pages 51-63

Abstract: This paper investigates leading by example as a policy prescription for international collective action to provide summation public goods. A country leads by example by committing to a minimal level of provision, and by matching higher contributions there beyond. In an evolutionary game-theoretic setting, we establish conditions for leading by example to be a neutrally stable strategy; i.e., to noncooperatively implement the cooperative outcome. These conditions are related to the degree of concavity of the contributors' utility functions and the incentives for free riding. They can be tested against empirical estimates of the public benefits of an international regime. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Date: 2005
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