Incentives and Standards in Agency Contracts

Robert G Chambers () and John Quiggin ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 7, issue 2, pages 201-228

Abstract: This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are risk substitutes and are socially undesirable, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a risk-complementary role. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Date: 2005

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Related works:
Working Paper: INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS IN AGENCY CONTRACTS (2000)
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