Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

Jonathan Thomas () and Tim Worrall ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 1, pages 151-181

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady-state properties of the optimum private unemployment insurance scheme are established. The interaction between public and private unemployment insurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one-to-one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximizing. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Date: 2007

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00302.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision (2005)
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:1:p:151-181

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is edited by John P. Conley and Myrna Holtz Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().