Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 1, pages 29-40

Abstract: Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Date: 2007

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