The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach

Torsten Amelung

Kyklos, 1989, vol. 42, issue 4, pages 515-32

Abstract: This paper examines empirically the causes and the origin of both the structure and the level of protection in developing countries, i.e., organized pressure groups, preferences of the electorates, and nationalistic attitudes on part of the government. However, regression analysis using effective protection as a dependent variable and certain industry characteristics as independent variables yields unsatisfactory results for developing countries. Therefore, the author develops an extended interest approach, which attempts to proxy the opposition and coalitions among various industries. As the empirical evidence for the case of Brazil 1973-75 shows, this approach adds to the explanatory power of the interest-group model. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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