Finite Lives and Social Institutions

Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

Kyklos, 1994, vol. 47, issue 4, pages 551-71

Abstract: According to common wisdom, collective and in particular democratic decision-making attenuates the shadow of the future. The authors illustrate collective ways of extending time horizons that are inaccessible for individuals. They propose a coalitional structure (specifically an age distribution of membership and a distribution of rewards) that is conducive to this task. What is on offer is a minimalist theory of 'corporate action' with potential applications ranging from political party formation to the theory of the firm. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Date: 1994
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:4:p:551-71

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0023-5962

Access Statistics for this article

Kyklos is edited by Rene L. Frey

More articles in Kyklos from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().