Power Corrupts, but Can Office Ennoble?

Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit

Kyklos, 2002, vol. 55, issue 2, pages 157-78

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of increased power associated with higher office on the quality of agent performance, within the context of a model in which agents care about what others think of them. They care that is about the esteem they enjoy. The object is to conduct a simple comparative static exercise in the "economy of esteem", isolating the various dimensions of the relation between office held and esteem-related incentives to perform in a more estimable way. Copyright 2002 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:55:y:2002:i:2:p:157-78

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