MIXED OLIGOPOLY, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES
Pedro Cantos-Sánchez () and
Manchester School, 2006, vol. 74, issue 3, pages 294-313
This paper explores frequency and pricing decisions in a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly when there is competition between means of transport and where one of the firms need not necessarily maximize profits. The private and the mixed duopoly are compared and distortions from the social optimum are identified, both analytically and numerically. A mixed duopoly does not recover the socially optimal solution. However, the presence of a (public) non-profit maximizing operator is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. When both operators are (private) profit maximizers, some control measures such as price caps and minimum service availability would reduce the distortions from the social optimum. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester 2006.
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