CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DETERMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK

Sourafel Girma (), Steve Thompson and Peter William Wright ()

Manchester School, 2007, vol. 75, issue 1, pages 65-81

Abstract: This paper examines the effect that the 'Cadbury reforms' have had on the pay determination process of executives in the UK. Our results suggest that, on average, the impact has been disappointing. The relationship between pay and performance remains weak and the link to firm size has, if anything, been strengthened. However, our results suggest considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the reforms, and for those firms above median employment the link between pay and profits appears to have been reinforced. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Corporate Governance Reforms and Executive Compensation Determination: Evidence from the UK (2003)
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