R&D COOPERATION AND COLLUSION: THE CASE OF JOINT LABS

Marie-Laure CABON-DHERSIN ()

Manchester School, 2008, vol. 76, issue 4, pages 424-435

Abstract: In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, the present note compares the performance of full cooperation (firms conduct R&D in a joint lab and collude in the product market) and full competition (firms compete in R&D as well as in the product market). The paper shows that (i) full cooperation leads to better results in terms of R&D efforts compared with non-cooperation; (ii) collusion at the production stage may increase both producers' and consumers' surplus especially when the degree of spillovers is not too high and the products are not homogeneous; (iii) the gains in terms of social welfare from full cooperation increase when the efficiency of R&D decreases. Copyright © 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

Date: 2008

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.01067.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:76:y:2008:i:4:p:424-435

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().