PRODIGALITY AND MYOPIA-TWO RATIONALES FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

Pierre Pestieau and Uri Possen

Manchester School, 2008, vol. 76, issue 6, pages 629-652

Abstract: Among the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

Date: 2008

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