STRATEGIC LICENSING AND SEQUENTIAL INNOVATIONS

Tina Kao

Manchester School, 2009, vol. 77, issue 4, pages 512-551

Abstract: We study inventors' strategic licensing behaviour when there are two generations of technology. The innovations are sequential, with the second invention built on the first. We show that if the market size is large and if the second innovation is relatively significant, the early inventor licenses by royalty and the second-generation inventor licenses by a fixed fee. The results suggest that royalty licensing may be more common in industries characterized by a high degree of cumulativeness in technology. Furthermore, we observe that early inventors license by royalty payments and subsequent inventors license by fixed fees. Copyright © 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.

Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02108.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:77:y:2009:i:4:p:512-551

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().