CAPITAL INFLOW UNDER VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT

Brati Sankar Chakraborty

Metroeconomica, 2008, vol. 59, issue 4, pages 633-655

Abstract: This paper investigates the welfare consequence of exogenous capital inflow for the host country when the source country implements 'voluntary export restraint'. In an imperfectly competitive market with an increasing returns to scale (IRS) sector, we show the possibility of welfare immiserization. Two channels are identified leading to immiserization. First, and this is direct, resource reallocation following capital inflow can squeeze the underproduced sector and reduce welfare. Second, contraction of the IRS sector can raise the return to capital, even when the price of the capital-intensive importable falls unambiguously. Thus, even with an improvement in commodity terms of trade, the factor terms of trade can worsen and reduce welfare. Copyright © 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 2008

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