WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME

Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer and Javier Perote ()

Pacific Economic Review, 2006, vol. 11, issue 2, pages 247-266

Abstract: We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Within-Team Competition in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game (2005)
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