Verdrängungspreise auf Telekommunikationsmärkten?

Justus Haucap () and Jörn Kruse

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2004, vol. 5, issue 3, pages 337-361

Abstract: The main argument commonly put forward against retail price deregulation in Germany's telecommunications markets is the concern that otherwise the former monopoly supplier may engage in predatory pricing. And even though some game theoretic models show that predation is sometimes possible, this paper argues that predatory pricing will generally not be profitable. However, prices below average cost and even below marginal cost may be part of a profit-maximizing business strategy without any predatory intent. Therefore, it is often difficult in practice to distinguish between predatory, anti-competitive price cuts and normal, competitive pricing policies. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004

Date: 2004

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