Wer soll für die Schulden im Bundesstaat haften? Eine vernachlässigte Frage der Föderalismusreform II

Charles B. Blankart () and Erik R. Fasten

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2009, vol. 10, issue 1, pages 39-59

Abstract: Mutual debt liability of the German federal states (Länder) contributed to the large increase of public debt in Germany over the last half century. A commission eager to impose stricter debt limits on state budgets encountered opposition by the Länder. This article proposes the strengthening of the Länder liability for their respective debt in order to disentangle interdependencies between state layers. A recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling is analyzed which sharply reduced bailout expectations of Länder and hence allows for the evolution of new institutions such as public bonds with collective action clauses as intermediate institutions towards strict bankruptcy procedures. Copyright 2009 die Autoren Journal compilation 2009, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 2009

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