RAND Journal of Economics

2008 - 2008

Edited by James Hosek

from RAND Corporation

This journal is a continuation of RAND Journal of Economics.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 39, issue 1, 2008

Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture pp. 1-19

Raymond Deneckere and Meng-Yu Liang

Rules of proof, courts, and incentives pp. 20-40

Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet

Industry dynamics with stochastic demand pp. 41-68

James Bergin and Dan Bernhardt

Properties of scoring auctions pp. 69-85

John Asker and Estelle Cantillon

Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market pp. 86-114

Ali Hortaçsu and Steven L. Puller

Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information pp. 115-143

Yaron Yehezkel

Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices pp. 144-162

Giovanni Dell'ariccia and Robert Marquez

Imperfect competition and quality signalling pp. 163-183

Andrew F Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses pp. 184-198

María-Angeles de Frutos and Thomas Kittsteiner

Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing pp. 199-213

Roman Inderst

Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing pp. 214-237

Nabil Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga and David Besanko

The value of information and optimal organization pp. 238-265

Sergei Severinov

Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem pp. 266-282

Stephanie Lau

Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good pp. 283-304

Isabelle Brocas

Status and incentives pp. 305-326

Emmanuelle Auriol and Régis Renault