Properties of scoring auctions

RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, vol. 39, issue 1, pages 69-85

Abstract: This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Properties of Scoring Auctions (2004)
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