First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information

Esther Gal-Or ()

Review of Economic Studies, 1987, vol. 54, issue 2, pages 279-92

Abstract: The author considers a leader-follower game with output quantities as strategies, so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the Stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information. At the equilibrium, the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand. In an attempt to signal low demand, the leader contracts his output. Nevertheless, unless the leader's information is infinitely noisy, the follower can always correctly infer his signal. The author finds a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better-off compared to the leader. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Date: 1987
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%2819870 ... 0.CO%3B2-V&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:2:p:279-92

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0034-6527

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Studies is edited by Andrea Prat, Bruno Biais, Kjetil Storesletten and Enrique Sentana

More articles in Review of Economic Studies from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().