Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

Steven Callander ()

Review of Economic Studies, 2007, vol. 74, issue 3, pages 653-684

Abstract: In this paper I show that an equilibrium exists to the sequential voting game in which a bandwagon begins with probability 1. These bandwagons are driven by a combination of beliefs and the desire of voters to vote for the winning candidate. Significantly, in this equilibrium the pivot probability for each voter is non-zero, even in an infinite population. Consequently, the bandwagons do not always start after one (or at most two) favourable decisions (as do economic cascades) and varying levels of informative voting are observed, consistent with observations from sequential voting in U.S. presidential primaries. Further, voters are exposed to counterintuitive incentives, referred to as "buyers' remorse", that have been attributed to real primary voters. Copyright 2007 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Date: 2007
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