Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing *

Arghya Ghosh () and Souresh Saha

Review of International Economics, 2008, vol. 16, issue 1, pages 45-68

Abstract: We consider strategic trade policy when a high-cost and a low-cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments-a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost-competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor "winners" when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing. Copyright © 2008 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 2008

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