Bargaining in International Trade under Exchange-Rate Uncertainty

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Itzhak Zilcha

Review of International Economics, 1995, vol. 3, issue 3, pages 249-63

Abstract: This paper examines the implications of various contracting alternatives between exporting and importing firms on the volume of international transactions. The contracts that we study are determined in a bargaining situation under exchange-rate uncertainty. First we look at contracts which entail an ex ante commitment on price and quantity of exports without the possibility of renegotiation ex post. Second, spot contracts, i.e., the price and the quantity of exports are negotiated after the exchange the rate is known. A third type of contracts consists of ex ante commitment and ex post renegotiation. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Barganing in International Trade under Exchange Rate Uncertainty (1993)
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