Vertical Integration and International Predation

Daniel M. Bernhofen ()

Review of International Economics, 1996, vol. 4, issue 1, pages 90-98

Abstract: This paper investigates the interrelationship between a firm's incentive to engage in international predatory pricing and its domestic vertical industry ties in the context of the deep-pocket theory of predation. The deep pocket stems from a vertically integrated firm's ability to shift funds between its upstream and downstream divisions, enabling it to prey on vertically unintegrated upstream competitors. Vertical integration is shown to function as a cause of and a deterrent to foreign predatory behavior. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1996
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