Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?

Leo Kaas ()

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 111, issue 1, pages 51-71

Abstract: This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste-based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms might increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run, although it would have disappeared without the policy. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2009 .

Date: 2009
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01554.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:111:y:2009:i:1:p:51-71

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is edited by Jonas Agell, Nils Gottfries and Espen R. Moen

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().