Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information

Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann ()

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 111, issue 1, pages 73-102

Abstract: We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations "ex post". This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2009 .

Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01555.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information (2006)
Working Paper: Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:111:y:2009:i:1:p:73-102

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is edited by Jonas Agell, Nils Gottfries and Espen R. Moen

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().