Prices and Information under Imperfect Competition

Torben M Andersen and Morten Hviid

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1999, vol. 46, issue 3, pages 245-59

Abstract: Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices. Copyright 1999 by Scottish Economic Society.

Date: 1999
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