Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market

James D. Dana and Kathryn E. Spier
Additional contact information
James D. Dana: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Kathryn E. Spier: Kellogg School of Management and School of Law, Northwestern University and NBER

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1

Abstract: In a homogeneous good, Cournot duopoly model, entry may occur even when the potential entrant has no cost advantage and no independent access to distribution. By sinking its costs of production before negotiating with the incumbents, the entrant creates an externality that induces the incumbents to bid more aggressively for the distribution rights to its output. Each incumbent is willing to pay up to the incremental profit earned from the additional output plus the incremental loss avoided by keeping the output away from its rival. This implies that the incumbents are willing to pay up to the market price for each unit of available output. A sequential game in which the incumbents produce first is analyzed, and the conditions under which entry is deterred by incumbents' preemptive capacity expansions are derived.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; entry deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=bejeap (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:19

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from Berkeley Electronic Press
Series data maintained by Avi Warner ().