Strategic Behavior and Social Norms in Tipped Service Industries

Ofer H. Azar ()

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, vol. 8, issue 1

Abstract: Tipping is a multi-billion-dollar phenomenon that traditional economic theory finds hard to explain. Why do people leave money as tips when service has already been provided? Two main potential reasons are that tipping is a social norm, and a strategic behavior aimed to assure good future service. A game-theoretical model is developed which allows the analysis of how tipping behavior should depend on patronage frequency if strategic motivations affect tipping. Thus, the model provides predictions that can be combined with empirical data on tipping behavior to answer the fundamental question, why do people tip?

Keywords: tipping; social norms; behavioral economics; service industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z13 L83 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:7

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