Cross-Country Policy Harmonization with Rent-Seeking

Patrik T. Hultberg and Edward B. Barbier ()
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Patrik T. Hultberg: Kalamazoo College

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, vol. contributions.3, issue 2

Abstract: In a reciprocal market model with imperfectly competitive firms, domestic policies will differ across countries that are economically and politically diverse. We explore the implications of this standard result with regard to harmonization of environmental policies between corrupt and non-corrupt countries. Imposing a more stringent policy on a non-corrupt government will be welfare reducing to the ‘receiving’ country, but may be welfare enhancing for the ‘imposing’ country. However, where environmental standards are under the control of a corrupt government, it is possible that harmonization is welfare enhancing to both countries.

Keywords: corruption; environmental policy; rent-seeking; reciprocal market model; harmonization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 O13 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.3:y:2004:i:2:n:4

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