Niku MÃ¤Ã¤ttÃ¤nen and
Panu Poutvaara ()
Additional contact information Niku MÃ¤Ã¤ttÃ¤nen: The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy and CEBR
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Niku Määttänen ()
The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum.