Market Entry Dynamics with a Second-Mover Advantage

Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait
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Vladimir Smirnov: University of Sydney
Andrew Wait: University of Sydney

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1

Abstract: We study a market-entry game with a second-mover advantage. In the symmetric equilibrium, there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability with which a player will invest (entry) and the length of time until the deadline. Moreover, the probability of investment can move chaotically as the horizon is extended. In the limit when the period length goes to zero chaotic trajectories arise when the efficiency effect does not hold -- that is, when the one-period monopoly profit is less than the total of the one-period duopoly profits. We also show that the presence of chaotic trajectories is associated with a smaller expected delay in entry.

Keywords: market entry; second-mover advantage; mixed strategy; deterministic chaos (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:11

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