Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy

Diego A. Dominguez and Antonio Nicolo
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Diego A. Dominguez: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
Antonio Nicolo: University of Padua

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1

Abstract: In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent's bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, based on distributional implications of these two properties, which selects a single allocation which is Pareto-optimal and satisfies no-envy in two-agent exchange economies. There is no straightforward generalization of our procedure to more than two-agents.

Keywords: no-envy; fair allocation; recursive methods; exchange economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:6

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