Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Stephen E. Morris
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Stephen E. Morris: Yale University

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2002, vol. advances.1, issue 1

Abstract: The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and may be robust to strategic decisions about whether to communicate.

Keywords: common knowledge; communication; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2002:i:1:n:5

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