Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection

Yossi Feinberg
Additional contact information
Yossi Feinberg: Stanford University

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. advances.6, issue 1

Abstract: We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

JEL-codes: C62 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1239&context=bejte (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
Series data maintained by Avi Warner ().