Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

David Gill () and Daniel Sgroi

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. topics.4, issue 1

Abstract: With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

Keywords: takeovers; sequential; pivotal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 G34 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:11

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