Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

Carmen Bevia and Luis C. Corchon ()
Additional contact information
Carmen Bevia: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and CODE

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. topics.6, issue 1

Abstract: We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems.

Keywords: cooperative production; sharing rules; sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D72 D78 J54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=bejte (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:16

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
Series data maintained by Avi Warner ().