The Economics of Scams
Stanley Miles and
Review of Law & Economics, 2017, vol. 13, issue 1, pages 18
This paper offers one of the first economic analyses of scams. Its major finding is that, unlike other crimes, imperfect enforcement may increase victimization by deterring only low-ability scammers whose failed attempts would otherwise alert potential victims before encounters with high-ability scammers. High-ability scammers may actually benefit from partial enforcement, which reduces their competition. These results may be reinforced when failed attempts are punished.
Keywords: scams; deterrence; crime; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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