Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three Strikes

Alexander Tabarrok () and Eric Helland
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Eric Helland: Claremont-McKenna College/RAND

Review of Law & Economics, 2009, vol. 5, issue 1

Abstract: California’s Attorney General was pleased to announce that “An unintended but positive consequence of ‘Three-Strikes’ has been the impact on parolees leaving the state….The growth in the number of parolees leaving California is staggering.” Law enforcement officers in other states were presumably less pleased. A displaced criminal is a benefit to California but a cost to other states. If such criminal spillovers are important, law enforcement will over-invest in policies that encourage displacement. We test whether California’s three-strikes law led to significant criminal spillovers.

Keywords: crime; spillovers; federalism; three strikes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:11

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