Criminal Associations with Bargaining and Build Frictions

Bryan Eldon Engelhardt ()

Review of Law & Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 2, pages 8

Abstract:

This paper analyzes how the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect criminal associations when retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities. Given the illicit nature of crime, a non-competitive market is considered where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions, and increase market activity or crime.

Keywords: crime; law enforcement; search; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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