Abstract:
This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001-3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive `abnormal' returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of 5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream-consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.
JEL-codes:F13F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2007
Canadian Journal of Economics is edited by Dwayne Benjamin
More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Address: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office CIREQ-C.R.D.E., Université de Montréal C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7, Canada Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().
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