Abstract:
We provide a model of know-how sharing between competing firms in which each of two firms gets a stochastic innovation in its stock of know-how in every period. Separately considering the cases when innovations are indivisible and divisible, we examine the nature of the subgame perfect sharing agreements that can obtain. We discover that both stochasticity and indivisibility undermine the ability to support sharing. Furthermore, we find that there are equilibria in which know-how sharing can be intermittent and that small innovations are more likely to be shared than large ones, when innovations are divisible but not necessarily when they are indivisible.
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Canadian Journal of Economics is edited by David Green
More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Address: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().
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