An Evidence-Based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts

Joshua Wright

Antitrust Chronicle, 2009, vol. 7

Abstract: A sensible consensus view emerged that a necessary condition for anticompetitive harm in an exclusive dealing or de facto exclusive contract is that the contract deprives rivals of the opportunity to compete.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/an-e ... nd-loyalty-discounts (application/pdf)
Requires login and subscription

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpi:atchrn:7.1.2009:i=5291

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Antitrust Chronicle from Competition Policy International
Series data maintained by Lindsay McSweeney ().