Consumer Protection in Markets with Advice

Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani ()

CPI Journal, 2010, vol. 6

Abstract: In this article we present some of the reasons why markets with advice may malfunction, and explore the potential rationales for some of the policy proposals that are on the table. Roman Inderst, University of Frankfurt and Imperial College London & Marco Ottaviani, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

JEL-codes: D18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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