The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis

Paul Missios () and Charles Plourde

Canadian Public Policy, 1996, vol. 22, issue 2, pages 144-150

Abstract: This paper examines the conflict over catch quotas for turbot on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland between the European Union (EU) and Canada. Economic game theory is used to analyse Canadian policy, EU policy, and the ensuing resolution. Recommendations are provided for future agreements regarding the proper management of fish stocks to ensure the long-term viability of these resources.

Date: 1996
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