The Anti-Competitive Effects of Brand-Controlled "Pseudo- Generics" in the Canadian Pharmaceutical Market

Aidan Hollis

Canadian Public Policy, 2003, vol. 29, issue 1, pages 21-31

Abstract: Brand-name pharmaceutical firms in Canada, upon the expiry of their patent, always license a "pseudo- generic" firm to compete directly against generic firms. This pseudo-generic is identical to the brand-name product, but is marketed as a generic, with the pseudo-generic firm receiving a distribution fee. This strategy deters entry into smaller drug markets, since the threat of pseudo-generic competition deters other generics from making the investment required to enter; and slows the process of entry by competing generic firms.

Date: 2003
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