On Collusion and Industry Size
Marc Escrihuela-Villar and
Jorge Guillén ()
Annals of Economics and Finance, 2011, vol. 12, issue 1, pages 31-40
In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firrms makes collusion harder to sustain.
Keywords: Collusion; Sustainability; Fringe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L41 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: /RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2011:v:12:i:1:p:31-40
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