On the redistributive impact of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement

Stefan Ambec () and Louis Hotte ()

Environment and Development Economics, 2006, vol. 11, issue 06, pages 677-696

Abstract: We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individuals wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wealth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.

Date: 2006

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355770X06003214 link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: On the redistributive impact of privitazing a resource under imperfect enforcement (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:endeec:v:11:y:2006:i:06:p:677-696_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Environment and Development Economics from Cambridge University Press
Address: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Series data maintained by Mike Eden ().